Tsar Nicholas II commemorated the tercentenary of the Romanov dynasty that controlled an enormous empire in 1913.[1] 3 years later, his rule marked an end. This investigation questions the extent of the socio-economic stability of Tsarist Russia before 1914 and thus, verifies Russia's entry into the World War on socio-economic grounds.
Socio-economic stability constitutes of a multitude of social, economic and political factors. Firstly, the most convenient way of determining socioeconomic stability includes the conventional way of measuring it via GDP, economic growth and GDP per capita. However, the 19th-century definitions could also include imperialist versions of economic power – namely land and abundance economic resources. Healthcare, education and infrastructure are important characteristics of socio-economic development. Militaristic power, employment rate, and political stability may be another cliché of measuring world power and thus determining socio-economic stability.
Pessimistic historians like Steve Wright argue that movements overlooked by the Tsar had already certified his fall creating a revolutionary political climate. Optimists like Steve Smith believe that gradual westernization in Russia by 1914 successfully created a stable political climate, thereby sheltering autocracy. Being one of the fastest-growing economies with an annual growth rate of 6%, Russia would have looked forward to a robust industrial economy in less than a decade. Consequently, employment and living standards would have improved placating political opposition and hence, promoting socio-economic growth.
Russia's socio-economic growth before 1914 cannot be overestimated since it was not on par with other world powers. Russia only had 15% of the world power compared to 26% of the USA[2], which was half its size. However, Russia's world power rose by 3% since 1900 and it overtook France, England, and equalized with Germany. Unfortunately, the accelerated industrial growth due to increasing world power created complications. The proletariat expanded and led to rural to urban migration straining the out-of-date infrastructure and potentially overstretching farmers. This worsened the socio-political environment as the number of people who took strike action in 1914 was the highest since 1905. Improvement in the socio-economic stability had been undermined and countered.
The Russian Famine of 1891-92 caused 375,000 to 500,000 deaths[3] reawakening Marxist and other revolutionary movements. Russian society, politicized by the famine [4] crisis, had its social conscience stung, and the old bureaucratic system discredited. The famine had proved the culpability and incompetence of the Romanov dynasty, a factor that undermined the nation’s socio-economic stability.
Socio-economic stability was restored by Sergei Witte, who served as Minister of Finance from 1892 to 1903[5]. Along with overseeing the development of the heavy industry, Witte correlated industrial growth to political and economic stability. He realized the need to invite multinationals, privatization, and foreign direct investment. Motivated by developed western countries, he welcomed experts from Britain, France, and Germany to advise him modernization. Witte successfully exploited the natural resources that Russia had, most notably, minerals in Siberia stimulated growth. The results included an increase in coal output in Ukraine, oil output in the Caucasus along with a great increase in cereal production. Russia's iron, coal, oil, and steel output tripled between 1890 and 1900.[6] Increasing output meant Russia could export and gave them a chance to attain foreign capital, which was worth more than roubles.[7] Increasing the output of normal goods was essential since it meant that the general population had more, and thus, the standard of living improved. This had a direct correlation with increasing social stability. Economic stability was brought in with the industrial growth increasing by 8% every year between 1890 and 1899, the highest growth rate amongst the major world powers. With economic stability in place, Witte’s policies allowed the government to focus more on improving welfare and thus, build up a positive social environment.
Even though industrialization led to increased economic stability, it had diverse effects on social stability. The book, End of Imperial Russia describes Witte’s efforts elegantly- “(Witte) put in place policies designed to create an environment in which industry could flourish in Russia”. The creation of jobs due to rapid economic growth meant that serfs migrated from rural areas leading to overcrowding in urban areas. Between 1881 and 1910, the population of Moscow and St. Petersburg doubled increasing insecurity, unrest and problems like overcrowding giving way to social instability. [8]
Economic growth was achieved at the cost of poor living and working conditions for the workers, contributing to an unhealthy socio-political climate. Kanatchikov, in ‘A Radical Worker in Tsarist Russia’ complains that days in his factory in Moscow “lasted eleven and a half hours with only one break for lunch which lasted an hour and a half”. Wages were poor and did not rise despite the inflation in the economy. Hiring workers daily, low labor protection laws or effective trade union meant that job insecurity was high.[9] Witte’s policy of industrializing may have been positive for the Russian economy, but unfairly benefited the upper and middle classes more than the lower class. For the proletariat, the working class, unfair wages, long working hours with low wages meant that industrialization exploited them more than it improved their standard of living.
Witte’s imposition of high taxes on everyday goods and household essentials like matches, sugar, and salt created additional problems. The sugar duties were raised 100% and by 1900 over 80% of all tax revenue was raised through taxes on necessities.[10] This left proletariat was unhappy but since they were disorganized, a rough socio-political atmosphere was produced. Economic stability undermined social stability.
On the one hand, Witte’s policies strengthened Russia leading up to WW1.[11] Huge capital investment led to considerable industrial and railway developments, bringing clear economic and military benefits. In this sense, successful economic modernization was achieved from an exceptionally low base - though it should also be noted there were clear limitations to this economic modernization, it should not be exaggerated.[12] Furthermore, his industrial drive failed to address the fundamental agricultural backwardness of Russia. Despite that, Historian Hugh Seton-Watson claims that Witte is "one of the outstanding statesmen of the 19th century”.
Unfortunately, rapid growth still left Russia as the poorest of the world powers. The per capita income in 1913 was 123 rubles. In comparision, this was 60 percent of what was held by Italy’s average citizen, 30 percent of Britain’s, and 40 percent of Germany’s.[13] Agricultural sector employed 77 percent of the labor force produced 44 percent of the output. Since farming was poorly integrated in the market economy, even in 1913 home consumption of non-market farm produces accounted for one-third of the GNI. Unconsumed meat, dairy produce, vegetables, and fruits was sold to the bustling overcrowded urban sectors and export market in return for cash.[14] With that money, farmers would purchase manufactured consumer goods bought domestically or imported. The autocratic, mercantilist, and protectionist Tsarist administration paid way more attention to constructing warships and bottling vodka than necessary. With modern public finance and two-thirds of government debt held at home, tax revenues were drawn majorly from imports and inelastic items traded in the retail market such as tobacco and sugar.[15]This put the tax burden on the consumers, the proletariat, who were already struggling from low wages, creating social unrest in the economy.
On the other hand, the fact there were no political reforms to match this economic modernization created a tension which undermined Russia before 1914.[16] For instance, the growth of a disgruntled industrial working class in the cities created fertile conditions for the growth of radical opposition in the face of poor conditions.
Olga Crisp was keenly aware of the ambiguities in government economic policy and noted that 'the finance ministry became something of a ministry of economic development' [17], but that 'narrowly financial matters were still its primary concern and took the upper hand over general economic interests’. With the country overwhelmed by civil conflicts, conservative repressions, precarious land, social and constitutional reforms, the social climate deteriorated and economic instability seen by the fall in private spending. Consequently, one can observe how a volatile political climate contributes negatively to socio-economic stability.
Whilst some historians positively speak about the wonders of the Tsarist government, the others adopt a negative stance and view the poor socio-economic growth as a prime factor in tsarism's inevitable downfall. Given this, I find the result of my investigation to be coherent and parallel with the beliefs conveyed by the distinguished historians. Considering the uneven distribution of resources, volatile political climate, stagnated growth discussed in this essay, I personally believe that there was socio-economic instability present in the Russian economy before 1914, one that should have prevented the country from entering the first world war.
[1] Figes, O. (2013). A people's tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891-1924. [2] Wohlforth, W. C. (1987). The perception of power: Russia in the pre-1914 balance. World Politics, 39(3), 353-381. https://doi.org/10.2307/2010224 [3]Kersti Lust. (2014). Feeding the landless in post-emancipation Livland during times of famine (1840s–1860s). The Slavonic and East European Review, 92(1), 63-74. https://doi.org/10.5699/slaveasteurorev2.92.1.0081 [4] Ó Gráda, C. (2007). Making famine history. Journal of Economic Literature, 45(1), 5-38. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.45.1.5 [5]Ananich, B. V., & S. A., Lebedev. (2005). Sergei Witte and the Russo-Japanese War.." International Journal of Korean History, 7.1, 109-131. Retrieved December 20, 2020. [6] Eric M. Johnson. (2015). Demographics, Inequality and Entitlements in the Russian Famine of 1891. The Slavonic and East European Review, 93(1), 96-119. doi:10.5699/slaveasteurorev2.93.1.0096 [7] Maddison, A. (2005). Growth and interaction in the world economy: The roots of modernity. Washington, D.C.: AEI Press. [8] Gatrell, P. (1996). Poor Russia: Environment and government in the long-run economic history of Russia (Vol. 2). Edward Hallett Carr. [9] Acton, E. (1997). Critical companion to the Russian Revolution: 1914-1921. London: Arnold. [10] Dowler, W. (2012). Russia in 1913. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press. doi:10.7591/j.ctv177tbw5.5 [11] Figes, O. (2017). A people's tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891-1924. Random House. [12] Ananich, B. V., & S. A., Lebedev. (2005). Sergei Witte and the Russo-Japanese War. ." International Journal of Korean History, 7.1, 109-131. Retrieved December 20, 2020. [13] Malle, S. (1992). Soviet Studies, 44(3), 533-535. Retrieved January 2, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/152429 [14] Davies, R. W. (1991). From Tsarism to the new economic policy: Continuity and change in the economy of the USSR (3rd ed., Vol. 44). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. [15] RAINBOW, D. (Ed.). (2019). Ideologies of Race: Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union in Global Context. Montreal, Kingston; London; Chicago: McGill-Queen's University Press. Retrieved October 7, 2020, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvqc6kkz [16] SHAFIYEV, F. (2018). Resettling the Borderlands: State Relocations and Ethnic Conflict in the South Caucasus. Montreal; Kingston; London; Chicago: McGill-Queen's University Press. Retrieved October 6, 2020, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt21c4ttb [17] Crisp, O. (n.d.). Studies in the Russian Economy before 1914: Olga Crisp: Palgrave Macmillan. Retrieved December 10, 2020, from https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9780333169070.